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Record Of Arrest: The Indelible Stain
HON. WALTER J. KARABIAN*
The collection and dissemination of information on individ-
ual citizens has reached frightening proportions in our society.
The individual is rapidly losing his privacy in our increasingly
technological society. The collection and widespread dissemi-
nation of records of arrests poses special problems. In this
article Mr. Karabian, the Majority Floor Leader of the Cali-
fornia State Assembly, discusses the problems which a record
of arrest can create for persons who were never convicted
of the crime for which they were arrested. Mr. Karabian
argues that the dissemination of arrest records constitute an
unwarranted invasion of the innocent individual's privacy and
is conceivably a violation of due process. The most serious
consequence of an arrest record is the effect it may have on
employment opportunities for the innocent individual. Mr. Kar-
abian analyzes the present statutes which regulate the dissemination
of records of arrest in California. In conclusion the author dis-
cusses several measures introduced in the 1971 Legislative session
which could have mitigated or prevented the harmful consequences
of an arrest record.
* Assemblyman Walter Karabian, B.A., M.S., J.D., is the Majority Floor Leader
of the California State Assembly. A graduate of the University of Southern California
Law School in 1963, he is a member of the California Bar. Mr. Karabian was a
Los Angeles County Deputy District Attorney prior to his election to the Legislature
in 1966.
The author gratefully acknowledges the assistance of Mrs. Anne Chiarenza, a mem-
ber of his staff. A member of the Massachusetts Bar, Mrs. Chiarenza is a graduate
of Boston University Law School and former Special Assistant Attorney General,
Commonwealth of Massachusetts.
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The Problem: Effects of an Arrest Record
There were 1,340,073 arrests of adults and juveniles in California
last year.' Roughly 50 percent of those persons arrested were either
released, dismissed or acquitted.' In other words, the number of per-
sons whose arrests led neither to prosecution nor conviction is roughly
equivalent to the population of a city the size of San Francisco, St.
Louis or Baltimore. Such statistics are the "stuff' of modem urban
life. They would not normally come within the purview of lawmakers
or civil libertarians but for the fact that, one way or another, all of these
arrests are recorded.
Dissemination of these records results in the stigma of a "police
record"; there can be little doubt that this stigma attaches as surely to
the innocent man as to the habitual criminal. It can, and often does,
haunt him the rest of his life. It can constitute the imposition of a le-
gally unsanctioned penalty which denies the innocent individual
public or private employment. A person applying for acceptance in
the armed forces, for example, or for a position in the civil service
or in private industry, or for a license, or membership in a professional
association, or for apprenticeship training, or a scholarship is generally
asked to respond to the question on the application form, "Were you
ever arrested?" 3 Occasionally the question excludes juvenile and petty
offenses. Usually, however, it is as inclusive and prejudicial as the ques-
tion on the Eimeke Application for Employment form, which is widely
used throughout the United States.4 It asks, "Were you ever arrested?
-If yes, describe in full." The applicant is allowed two and one-half
lines to "describe in full." If his answer is "yes," he is often automat-
ically disqualified, whatever the circumstances of his arrest. 5
Such discrimination is unconscionable, even against the convicted
offender who has served his time. It can be devastating to the in-
nocent victim. A law review comment recounts the case histories of
two such persons:6
"J.P." was arrested and booked on suspicion of murder. The mur-
1. Documentation by the California Bureau of Criminal Statistics. Accord-
ig to the Bureau, there were 214,836 felony arrests; 742,301 misdemeanor arrests; and
382,935 juvenile arrests.
2. The Bureau of Criminal Statistics estimates (there are no exact figures) that
over 50 percent of the felony arrests and over 40 percent of the misdemeanor arrests
resulted in release, dismissal, or acquittal, and about 52 percent of the juvenile appre-
hensions resulted in release or other non-judicial disposition.
3. See Hess, Abuse of the Record of Arrest Not Leading to Conviction, 13
CRujE two DELin. 495 (1967).
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Comment, Guilt by Record, 1 CAL. WEsmRN L. Rnv. 126 (1965).
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derer had been described as over six feet tall, with black hair, and
about 30 years of age. "J.P.", on the other hand, was five feet ten
inches, with light brown hair, and 21 years old. He was incarcerated
for three days, after which he was released and assured that the ar-
rest could never be held against him.'
The next day he went to work on a new job for the city.
A few weeks later he received a letter from the Civil Serv-
ice stating his employment was to be terminated because he
had been arrested within the last year. After a hearing at
which the situation was explained, he was permitted to keep
the job. Later he applied for a different city job. On the
application, when he came to the part about a possible ar-
rest record, he gave the date, as instructed, but under 'Na-
ture of Offense' wrote 'None.' As an explanation, he added,
'Mistaken Identity.' The clerks at first refused to accept the
application but finally did 'under protest' pending a decision
of the Civil Service Board.8
The other case involved a school teacher.0
She was thirty-five years old, single (widowed), and had
no children. She went to a cocktail lounge with a date who
subsequently became drunk and obnoxious and was ordered
to leave. The police were called, and he gave them some
trouble and he was arrested. She then asked if she could talk
with him in order to get the car keys to drive herself home. The
police refused this request and she became angry and upset, and
was then herself arrested for interfering with an arrest. Her boy-
friend was convicted of being drunk and disorderly. As for the
the case against her, the district attorney recommended dismissal
in the interest of justice. She returned to work, but was refused
tenure the following year. She appealed the school board's deci-
sion, but lost. There appeared to be no real basis for denial of
tenure because her supervisors had given her adequate ratings. She
was forced to leave the teaching field.10
These case histories of two persons whose arrest records were ob-
tained by employers are probably representative of thousands which
go unreported. A more recent example of the effect of a "criminal" rec-
ord on a person's employment can be found in New York. Several
hundred employers of a securities firm, who submitted themselves for
fingerprinting in compliance with a statutory requirement, were found
7. Id. at 127.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 128.
10. Id.
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to have "criminal" records?1 Soon thereafter they lost their jobs despite
the fact that over half of those fired had no conviction records. 12
Employers in general tend to make no distinction between per-
sons with arrest records and persons with convictions. Both are
considered bad employment risks. According to a recent study of em-
ployment agencies, seventy-five percent of the agencies sampled re-
fused to make a referral when the applicant has an arrest record.'3 "The
refusal to refer is automatic and unqualified; the fact that the applicant
was not convicted of the offense for which he had been arrested
had no effect on the refusal."' 4 Another survey revealed that sixty-six
of seventy-five employers would not consider hiring anyone who had
been charged with assault but had been acquitted.' 5
Although some employers may investigate the facts surrounding an
arrest, the attitude of most employers and employment agencies is
probably summed up by the testimony of a former San Francisco County
Democratic Party Chairman. He was asked by the San Francisco
Postmaster to solicit extra workers for the Christmas rush. The Post-
master specifically said, "please don't send me anyone who is under
the age of eighteen or anybody who has ever been arrested." The chair-
man replied, "you mean anyone who has ever been convicted, don't
you?" The Postmaster responded, "No, I mean what I said . . .
this is the Christmas rush, and we hire lots of extra people, and we
don't have time to check everybody, and so we just don't want to be
bothered with anybody who has ever had a record of an arrest."'
One author claims that employers justify their reliance on arrest rec-
ords on the grounds that the arrest did not result in conviction because
the arrested person was probably guilty but "got off" because of "lack
of evidence" or a "legal technicality.""17
These arguments for relying on arrest records do not consider the
abuses in law enforcement which can make the mere record of arrest
an unreliable indication of character. Police harassment, arrests for
'investigation" or "on suspicion"-without a warrant and without prob-
able cause are an everyday occurrence in the ghettos and barrios of
11. See the New York Times, Feb. 5, 1970, at 1, col. 2.
12. Id.
13. PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON LAw ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUS-
TicE, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 75 (1967) [hereinafter cited as
PRESIDENT'S COMM'N REPORT].
14. Hess, supra note 3, at 496.
15. See Schwartz and Skolnick, Two Studies of Legal Stigma, SocIL PROB.,
Fall, 1962, at 133.
16. Hearings on Erasure of Arrest Records, before the California Assembly
Committee on Criminal Procedure, June 10, 1964, p. 4.
17. Hess, supra note 3, at 495.
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every major city in the nation.'8 Riot control procedures which result
in mass arrests, as well as the wholesale arrests for vagrancy which
occur when police round up suspects after a crime, particularly affect
the poor, Mexican Americans and blacks, and probably account for
the fact that among the black population the incidence of arrest may
reach ninety percent of the male working population."9 Additionally,
citizens may be arrested under various catch-all provisions, such as
"disorderly conduct," which affect persons "who, neither homeless nor
drunk, get into arguments with neighbors, talk back to police officers,
stand around idly, make speeches on street comers, play music on the
sidewalk or in the parks, grow long hair on their chin or head, gather
in small or large groups, or look like homosexuals."20
People who get into this kind of trouble with the police are generally
poor and powerless. Yet, they are forced to function in an intensely
competitive society with "one strike already against [them] since to
much of the outside world, an arrest record is tantamount to convic-
tion."2' Employment discrimination based on previous arrests hits
hardest, therefore, at the socio-economic level which can least afford
it.
The Rights of Society v. The Rights of the Individual
Historically, case law has granted the police broad discretionary power
to use whatever weapons they choose, including arrest records, to dis-
charge their duty to protect society.22  In Sterling v. Oakland 3 the
California First District Court of Appeal held that the plaintiff had
no right to demand return of her fingerprints and photographs taken
by the police even though the charges were dismissed.24 The court
pointed out that there was
no allegation that the fingerprints and photograph would be
disseminated generally, or at all, and there is no allegation that the
photograph would be exhibited in any way to the public, or that it
would be available for public inspection. 5
18. Id.
19. PREsiDENT'S COm'N REPORT, at 37.
20. Hess, supra note 3, at 497-8.
21. Comment, The F.B.L's Right to Retain and Disseminate Arrest Records of
Persons Not Convicted of a Crime May Be Limited by the First and Fifth Amend-
ments, 46 NoTRE DAME LAW. 825, 829 (1971).
22. Mabry v. Kettering, 89 Ark. 551, 117 S.W. 746 (1909); State ex rel. Mavity v.
Tyndall, 224 Ind. 364, 66 N.E.2d 755 (1946), 225 Ind. 360, 74 N.E.2d 914 (1947),
appeal dismissed, 333 U.S. 834, reh. denied, 333 U.S. 858 (1948); Fernicola v. Keenan,
136 NJ. Eq. 9, 39 A.2d 851 (1944). Herschel v. Dyra, 365 F.2d 17 (7th Cir. 1966).
23. 208 Cal. App. 2d 1 (1962).
24. Id. at 4.
25. Id. at 2.
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The court relied on case law from other states and also noted that no
statute required the return of this material when the charges were dis-
missed.2 6 The court concluded that the subject matter of plaintiff's
complaint belonged within the legislative domain27 and since the Leg-
islature, in 1961, added Section 11116 to the Penal Code,28 the fact
that the complaint against plaintiff was dismissed had been recorded.29
The court in Sterling noted, however, that
particular cases may be presented in which privacy would be
so threatened, by indiscriminate or injudicious display of a
photograph by custodians of records, and particularly of photo-
graphs, as to justify action by a court of equity. .... 0
Thus, the court at least recognized the possibility that "an indiscrimi-
nate or injudicious" use of fingerprints and photographs, obtained
upon an arrest, would be an invasion of privacy.
The power of law enforcement agencies to retain and disseminate
records pursuant to their responsibilities is not disputed. At issue is
the extent to which these records may be disseminated and the uses
to which they may be put. When an individual has in fact committed
a crime, records of his arrest and capture may be valuable to police in
their investigation of future crimes of a similar nature by allowing
them to compare the modus operandi of the "new" and "old!' crime.
Further, it can be argued that the individual who is not charged be-
cause of a "lack of evidence" may be likely to commit another crime, if
he did in fact commit the crime with which he was originally charged.
Therefore, the government may have an interest even in the arrest rec-
ords of individuals who were not convicted.
The broad discretion originally given to police agencies to maintain
and utilize records of arrest was based on the premise that the individual
must suffer the humiliation of a police record for the benefit of so-
ciety as a whole.31 Since World War II, the United States has experi-
enced a tremendous increase in the size and mobility of its population
and a corresponding increase in criminal activity. It could be argued,
therefore, that the broad discretion granted police organizations by the
26. Id. at 6.
27. Id.
28. CAL. PEN. CODE §11116 provides in part:
Whenever a criminal complaint or accusation is filed in any superior, mu-
nicipal or justice court, the clerk, or, if there be no clerk, the judge of that
court shall furnish a disposition report of such case to the sheriff, police de-
partment or other law enforcement agency primarily responsible for the in-
vestigation of the crime alleged in a form prescribed or approved by the Bu-
reau of Criminal Identification and Investigation.
29. 208 Cal. App. 2d 1, 7 (1962).
30. Id.
31. Fernicola v. Keenan, 136 NJ. eq. 9, 39 A.2d 851 (1944).
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courts in earlier, more tranquil times, is equally justifiable today,
were it not for the corresponding development of the modem tele-
communications system. The very nature of a computerized society
dictates that arrest records, retained as a police expedient, must be dis-
seminated with scrupulous regard for the innocent individual's funda-
mental rights.
Computer technology has magnified alarmingly the potential for
harm of an arrest record for an innocent individual. In the past an ar-
rest record, if retained, was rarely disseminated beyond neighboring
police or public agencies. Today because of the speed and range
of the computer, the broadcast of this kind of information is automatic
and mindless. The F.B.I. alone circulates information to more than
14,500 private and public agencies" as well as the United States Civil
Service Commission, and all branches of the Armed Services. 3 It is
further estimated that the F.B.I. distributes a minimum of 100,000 arrest
records per month just to federal agencies.3 4
Public agencies are not the only ones privy to arrest information. A
California employer has remarked that if he could pay the fee for a
record search, most police and sheriffs agencies would provide him
with a rap sheet.35 "Rap sheets", however, are often incomplete; they
show records of arrest, but not of acquittal or dismissal. In fact, the
President's Crime Commission found that thirty-five percent of all rec-
ords were incomplete in regard to the final disposition of the case.36
The use of arrest records by employers, therefore, does the most seri-
ous injury to the innocent individual. It can be argued that this re-
liance by employers on incomplete arrest records violates one of the
fundamental tenets of our free society: the presumption that one is
innocent until proven guilty. Furthermore, it seems reasonable to con-
clude that an innocent individual who is dismissed from or denied a
job, or is denied admittance to a school or professional membership
solely because of a record of arrest is deprived of property without
due process of law.
Recent cases have allowed certain individuals to purge the police
files of their arrest records." Although these cases were decided on
32. FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, COOPERATION, THE BACKBONE OF EFFEC-
TIVE LAW ENFORCEMENT 12 (1968).
33. 3 C.F.R. 936 (Comp. 1949-53), Exec. Order, No. 10,450. See also Com-
ment, F.B.I. Rap Sheets-An Invasion of Constitutional Rights?, 20 CATH. L. Rnv. 511(1971).
34. Hoover, The Confidential Nature of F.B.I. Reports, 8 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1(1956).
35. Comment, supra note 6, at 132.
36. PREsIDENT's COMM'N REPORT, at 268.
37. Hughes v. Rizzo, 282 F. Supp. 881 (E.D. Pa. 1968); United States v. Kal-
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the specific facts, the evidence generally showed that the record did not
function to protect society whereas it did have the potential of damag-
ing the individual. This trend away from the older case law principle
of police discretion in the retention of arrest records may be due in
part to the increasing recognition of a fundamental right to privacy.
The United States Supreme Court in Griswold v. Connecticut" struck
down a Connecticut statute which prohibited the sale of contraceptive
devices or instruction in the methods of contraception. The Court held
that this statute violated the individuals fundamental right to pri-
vacy.39 Recently, several courts have attempted to buffer the impact of
technological advances in record-keeping and surveillance by enlarging
the scope of the protection of privacy to include arrest records. This
principle may have been first expressed in the opinion of Chief Judge
Cancio in United States v. Kalish:40
When an accused is acquitted of the crime or when he is
discharged without conviction, no public good is accomplished
by the retention of criminal identification records. On the
other hand, a great imposition is placed upon the citizen ....
[This] preservation of records constitutes an unwarranted at-
tack upon his character and reputation and violates his right
of privacy.41
The Federal Court of Appeal for the District of Columbia recently
considered two cases involving the effect of arrest records on an in-
nocent individual. In 1969 the court, in Morrow v. District of Colum-
bia,42 noted "(t)he main evil produced by dissemination of arrest
records thus seems to be the adverse effect on job opportunity."'43 The
court also pointed out that "other evils, such as unjustified invasion
of privacy, particularly where innocent persons are arrested, may result
from. . . dissemination in particular cases."44 In Morrow the court of
appeal affirmed a lower court order which included an order expunging
defendant's arrest record.45
In 1970 the court decided the case of Menard v. Mitchell.46 On
August 10, 1965 Dale Menard, then a 19 year old college student,
was taken into custody by the Los Angeles police on suspicion of
ish, 271 F. Supp. 968 (D.C. P.R. 1967); Wheeler v. Goodman, 306 F. Supp. 58 (W.D.
N.C. 1969).
38. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
39. The court could not agree as to which provision of the constitution established
this fundamental right, but the majority agreed that such a right exists.
40. 271 F. Supp. 968 (D.C. P.R. 1967).
41. Id. at 970.
42. 417 F.2d 728 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
43. Id. at 742.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. 430 F.2d 486 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
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burglary. He was held for two days before being released after "the
police were 'fully satisfied' that no basis existed for charging him
with a crime."47  A record of Menard's arrest and a copy of his fin-
gerprints were fowarded to the F.B.I.
Menard brought an action in the District Court for the District of
Columbia to purge the record of his arrest and detention from the files
of the F.B.I. California Penal Code Section 849b(1) provides that
any person arrested but later released without being charged is deemed
to have been "detained" rather than arrested.4" Menard contended that
his detainment could not be used as the basis of a record in the F.B.I.'s
"criminal identification files." 49  Specifically, Menard sought to com-
pel the Attorney General and the Director of the F.B.I. to remove his
fingerprints and a notation regarding his detainment by the Los Angeles
police from the F.B.I.'s criminal identification files. The district court
granted the government's motion for a summary judgment. The court
of appeal reversed and remanded the case for trial, finding that the
facts "were simply inadequate for the proper resolution of the com-
plex questions presented.""0
In rejecting the government's request for affirmance of the summary
judgment the court noted the harmful consequences of an arrest rec-
ord:
Information denominated a record of arrest, if it becomes known,
may subject an individual to serious difficulties. Even if no direct
economic loss is involved, the injury to an individual's reputation
may be substantial. Economic losses themselves may be both
direct and serious. Opportunities for schooling, employment, or
professional licenses may be restricted or nonexistent as a con-
sequence of the mere fact of an arrest, even if followed by an
acquittal or complete exoneration of the charges involved. 5'
The court went on to note
There is, to say the least, serious question whether the Con-
stitution can tolerate any adverse use of information or tan-
gible objects as the result of an unconstitutional arrest of the
individual concerned. 52
Apparently as instruction to the trial court the court of appeal
47. Id. at 487.
48. CAL. PEN. CODE §849b(1) provides:
any peace officer may release from custody, instead of taking such person
before a magistrate, any person arrested without a warrant whenever: (1)
He is satisfied that there are insufficient grounds for making a criminal com-
plaint against the person arrested.
49. 430 F.2d 486, 489 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
50. Id. at 495.
51. Id. at 490.
52. Id. at 491.
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stated that "if appellant can show that his arrest was not based on prob-
able cause, it is difficult to find constitutional justification for its
memorialization in the F.B.I.'s criminal files".53
The court in Menard recognized the logistical problem confronting
the F.B.I. in its efforts to keep its records up to date.54 The court
stressed the need to restrict dissemination and suggested that the in-
terests of society and the individual might be protected if retention
were allowed and dissemination stringently limited.55
The cases cited above illustrate the basic problem, which is to strike
a balance between the rights of the individual and the rights of society.
The courts have attempted to protect the innocent individual from the
harmful consequences of an arrest record in our increasingly techno-
logical society. It is possible to argue that any use of the arrest record
of a person not charged or convicted is a denial of due process in that
it may impose a penalty (loss of employment opportunity) on innocent
persons. The use of these records by employers may also constitute an
invasion of the right to privacy. Even if an individual has been
convicted, use of his record by an employer may be double punish-
ment; after he has paid his "debt' to society, he is further deprived,
not of his freedom, but of the opportunity to work and support him-
self. In view of the possible injury to innocent persons, resulting
from easy access to records of arrest, the California Legislature has
enacted certain laws which protect the innocent individual, but pro-
vide for the retention of criminal records as resources in criminal inves-
tigations.
Regulation of Criminal Records in California
In California, records maintained by law enforcement agencies are
not classified as records which the public has a right to inspect.5"
However, California courts have been reluctant to order fingerprints
and photographs returned to innocent persons since the disposition of
arrest records has been held to be a legislative function.57  Further-
more, the cost of returning or destroying criminal records must be a
factor in determining whether to destroy the record, or merely to re-
strict its dissemination. California Penal Code Section 11105 restricts
the dissemination of the records of the Bureau of Criminal Identifi-
53. Id. at 492.
54. Id. at 494, note 51.
55. Id. at 492-3.
56. People v. Witkins, 135 Cal. App. 2d 371 (1955). See also, 36 Ops. ATr'Y
GEN. 1 (1960).
57. Sterling v. Oakland, 208 Cal. App. 2d 1 (1962). See discussion in text at
note 27.
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cation and Investigation (C.I. & I.) to "peace officers, district attor-
neys, probation officers and courts of the state. . . United States offi-
cers or officers of other states . . . and to any public defender or at-
torney representing such person in proceedings upon a petition for cer-
tificate of rehabilitation and pardon. . .. ".- But this section does
not apply to the records in local police files. Section 11105 further
provides that the person requesting the record must state "the infor-
mation applied for is necessary for the due administration of the laws
and not for the purpose of assisting a private citizen in carrying
on his personal interests or in maliciously or uselessly harassing, degrad-
ing or humilitating any person."" 9
In 1961,0 the Legislature enacted Penal Code Sections 11115-11117
which provide that there must be a disposition report on any person
whose record of arrest has been transmitted to the C.I. & I. These
sections require the courts6' and law enforcement agencies62 to report
to the C.I. & I. the final disposition of arrest cases so that the record
"will not show merely a dangling reference to an arrest. ' 63  Further,
it is provided that the disposition report may be asserted by a person
in answer to any question regarding his arrest, detention, or the out-
come of any criminal proceeding against him.6
Section 11105 of the Penal Code (restriction on dissemination of
C.I. & I. records) and Sections 11115-11117 (reporting of disposition)
serve, to some extent, to protect an innocent individual with a record
of arrest. However, Section 11105 imposes no criminal or civil pen-
alties on local officers or public employees if they subsequently turn the
C.I. & I. information over to private employers, nor does it prohibit dis-
semination of local records. It has been claimed that private in-
vestigators often procure this information for prospective employers.6 5
Sections 11115-11117, which provide that disposition of the case
shall be entered on the record, may be ineffective to eliminate the
58. CAL. PEN. CODE §1105(b).
59. Id. Subdivision (c) of Section 11105 provides that the C.I. & L information
shall not be provided to any person "other than those listed in subdivision (b)." But
the information may be furnished to any state agency or officer when needed for the
performance of official functions.
60. CAL. STATS. 1961, c. 1025, §1, p. 2709.
61. CAL. PEN. CODE §11116.
62. CAL. PEN. CODE §11115.
63. Baum, Wiping Out a Criminal or Juvenile Record, 40 CALW. S.B.J. 816,
825 (1965).
64. CAL. PEN. CODE §11116.5.
65. Karst, The Files: Legal Control over the Accuracy and Accessibility of
Stored Personal Data, 31 L. AND CONTEMP. PROB. 342 (1966). At 365 the author
states:
. . . any private investigator worthy of the name can get access to the infor-
mation on anyone's "make sheet" [law enforcement agencies' records containing
"arrest, detention, and conviction records].
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harmful consequences of a record if the employers operate on the as-
sumption "that where there is smoke there is fire." Employers may
assume the person was released on a "legal technicality."
Even if there is a final disposition entered on the record at C.I. & I.,
there may be inaccuracies due to mistaken identity. In White v. State of
California66 the Third District Court of Appeal held that, absent
a showing of malice on the part of the C.I. & I., the plaintiff was without
a cause of action based upon invasion of privacy or defamation.6"
White alleged that because of a mistake in identity, the C.I. & I.
files contained false information as to his criminal activities.68 He fur-
ther alleged that this information was disseminated by the C.I. & I.,
and that this dissemination resulted in his being released from or dis-
qualified for security jobs.69 Subsequent to his unfortunate employ-
ment experiences, White became aware of the inaccurate records
held by the C.I. & I. Upon notifying the C.I. & I. of the falseness of
the information contained in his Master Record Sheet, White was in-
formed that he should have the agency submitting the information ad-
vise the C.I. & I. that the information was false.70
The burden of establishing actual malice which must be shown be-
cause of the privilege conferred on the C.I. & I., will almost al-
ways prevent an individual harmed by this type of information from
succeeding in an action for invasion of privacy. It should be noted
here that the C.I. & I. does have a very thorough filing system that is
cross-indexed and cross-checked by fingerprints, names and pictures,
and that the probability of false information due to internal mistakes is
minimal.
The sealing of a criminal record is another means of circumventing the
prejudicial effects of the record. However, California's sealing stat-
utes apply solely to minors. Penal Code Section 851.7 provides that
any record of arrest or detention for misdemeanor committed while
a minor shall be sealed under the following circumstances: (1) if the
minor was released from custody because the arresting officer de-
termined there were insufficient grounds for making a criminal com-
plaint; (2) if proceedings were dismissed, or he was discharged
without conviction, or (3) if the minor was acquitted. Section 851.7
does not apply to cases where the minor was taken into custody pur-
suant to Sections 625 of the Welfare and Institution Code (generally,
66. 17 Cal. App. 3d 621 (1971).
67. Id. at 630.
68. Id. at 623.
69. Id. at 623-624.
70. Id.
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minors under 18 who habitually refuse to obey parents, who are
habitual truants, or who fail to obey orders of the court) or to cases
within the scope of Section 781 of the Welfare and Institutions Code
(petition for sealing records of juvenile courts).
Nor does section 851.7 apply to any proceedings relating to Section
290 of the Penal Code (sex perversion), Division 10 of the Health and
Safety Code (narcotics), or any offense under the Vehicle Code or lo-
cal ordinance relating to the operating of a motor vehicle.
Other sealing statutes relating to minors are Penal Code Sections
1203.4 and 1203.45. Section 1203.4 provides that all defendants, both
minors and adults, after having served conditions of probation may
petition the court to set aside the verdict of guilty, whether by plea or
trial, and thereafter be relieved of all penalties and disabilities result-
ing from the conviction. Section 1203.45, which applies only to min-
ors, provides that if the minor was eligible for the relief granted under
section 1203.4, the record of the minor may be sealed (in misde-
meanor cases). The same exceptions which apply to the sealing of rec-
ords under Section 851.7 apply to the sealing of a juvenile record under
Section 1203.45. Section 1203.45 further provides that "(t)hereafter
such conviction, arrest, or other proceeding shall be deemed not to have
occurred, and the petitioner may answer accordingly any question re-
lating to their occurrence."
The net result of these sections is that the record of an offense al-
legedly committed while a minor may be sealed, but an offense al-
legedly committed by an adult will be treated as a dismissed case. The
adult will always carry the stigma of the arrest or detention.
The impact of these sections can have a devastating effect on adults
who have been arrested but never tried. If the adult was released
from custody pursuant to Penal Code Section 849(b) (1) (insufficient
grounds for a criminal complaint), Section 851.6 entitles him to receive
a certificate from the arresting officer, or his superior, stating that the
action taken was but a detention. However, many employment ap-
plications now ask whether the applicant has been "detained" or
"taken into custody." 1  Presumably the applicant who has been de-
tained must answer in the affirmative."2 An answer in the affirma-
tive may result in his rejection; and answer in the negative, if the em-
ployer somehow gains access to a rap sheet, will certainly disqualify
the applicant as the employer will consider him a liar, and not worthy
of trust.
71. Rhine, Civil Liability for Illegal Arrest, 19 HASTINGS L.. 974, 977, note 17
(1967).
72. McMahon v. Municipal Court, 6 Cal. App. 3d 194, 200 (1970).
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A job applicant who has been arrested, but never brought to trial
-even if the arrest was totally erroneous-is therefore caught in a
web. He has no effective action for invasion of privacy; he may be re-
fused the right to earn a living because of the arrest, although his
guilt has not been tried; and there is no threat of sanction to prevent
the prospective employer from so prejudging him. The injury to this
job applicant would seem to be in clear violation of the fundamental
principle of the presumption of innocence until proven guilty.
Legislation Proposed in 1971
Several bills were introduced in the 1971 Session of the California
Legislature directly relating to the retention and dissemination of ar-
rest records. Some of these expanded the current laws relating to the
sealing of records of juveniles. 7  The remaining proposals were not
limited to juvenile records, but attempted to address the general problem
of the indiscriminate dissemination of arrest records by (1) expanding
currently existing laws relating to the sealing of criminal records
to include adults;74 (2) providing for the personal inspection of records
kept by the C.L & J.;75 (3) imposing sanctions for unlawful dis-
semination to prospective employers; 76 and (4) creating a superagency
empowered to monitor the collection and dissemination of criminal
records.77
Since Penal Code Section 851.7, allowing juveniles to seal their crim-
inal records under certain circumstances, was enacted in 1967,78
proposals have been made each year to extend its provisions to adults.
Senate Bill 11 and Assembly Bill 71, as introduced in the 1971 Ses-
sion, would have amended Penal Code Section 851.7 to allow adults
as well as minors to petition the court to seal records in felony as well as
misdemeanor cases. However, some officials have testified that this
procedure could be very costly to the state79 because of the large num-
ber of records which would have to be sealed.
Senate Bill 1481 permits any person to apply to the C.I. & I. to ex-
amine his master record sheet. If the person wants to challenge the in-
formation contained in the record, he must submit a written request to
the Bureau alleging inaccuracy or incompleteness. He must also specify
73. Assembly Bills 466, 468, 2167; and Senate Bill 1624, 1971 Regular Session.
74. S.B. 11 and A.B. 71, 1971 Regular Session.
75. S.B. 1429 and 1481, 1971 Regular Session.
76. A.B. 467 and A.B. 1053, 1971 Regular Session.
77. A.B. 2695, 1971 Regular Session.
78. CAL. STATS. 1967, c. 1373, p. 3223.
79. See REPORT OF THE ASSEMBLY INTERIM COMM=rrEE ON CRIMINAL PRO-
CEDURE 1963-1965, at 23, 24.
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the proof to corroborate his claim. The C.I. & I. must then forward
the request to the agencies which originally supplied the information.
If the agency concurs, the record will be corrected; if there is a dis-
pute between the person and the agency the matter must be submitted
for administrative adjudication in accordance with the provisions of the
Government Code. The provisions of Senate Bill 1481 should prevent
the plaintiff's problem in White v. State of California from arising in
the future.s0
Senate Bill 1429 would have allowed the individual to obtain a
copy of his C.I. & I. record. To prevent employers from coercing em-
ployees into providing a copy of their record, the bill would have im-
posed civil liability on any person requiring a copy of the record as
a condition of employment.
There is at present no statutory remedy available in California to a
person denied employment because of his arrest record.81 Recently,
however, discrimination in employment based solely on a record of ar-
rests not leading to conviction was held to be in violation of Title
VIIs2 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.83 Plaintiff in the case was a
sheet metal mechanic who, after accepting employment with Litton Sys-
tems, Inc., was required to fill out a "Preliminary Security Informa-
tion" form. The company used this form to implement their policy of
refusing applicants with records of multiple arrests. Litton withdrew
its offer of employment because of plaintiff's record of 14 arrests with-
out a conviction. 4 Plaintiff, who was black, alleged that the com-
pany's hiring practices were discriminatory under Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964. The court held for the plaintiff and concluded that
a blanket policy of refusing to hire persons solely because of arrests,
not leading to conviction, violates Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 because blacks are arrested substantially more frequently than
whites, and the policy lacks any business justification.8 5
80. 17 Cal. App. 3d 621 (1971). See text at note 66 supra.
81. We know of no statute protecting against discrimination against persons
with criminal records .... Perhaps the closest analagous statutes are those
protecting individuals from discrimination in employment because of race or
religion.
S. RuBEN, LAw OF CRamNALr ComiucTIoN 639 (1963). Also, the dictum of a labor
arbitration decision stated that if an individual were discharged because of his F.B.I.
rap sheet, he would have to be reinstated 'Tor under our Anglo-American system ofjustice everyone is presumed innocent until proven guilty." Mississippi Valley Gas
Co., 41 Lab. Arb. 745, 748 (1963).
82. 42 U.S.C. §2000e-2(a) (1) (1964), which reads in part:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-(1) to fail or
refuse to hire or to discharge any individual ... because of such individual's
race.
83. Gregory v. Litton Systems, Inc., 316 F. Supp. 401 (C.D. Cal. 1970).
84. Thirteen of the 14 arrests occurred before 1959.
85. Among the black population the incidence of arrests may reach 90 percent
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The relief awarded in the case was a prohibition against the use of ar-
rest records for all applicants. The defendant company was enjoined
"from utilizing as a factor in determining any conditions of employ-
ment-including hiring, promotion and termination-any record of ar-
rest which did not result in conviction."8 6 Had the court -limited the re-
lief to black workers, the result could have been prejudicial to pros-
pective white applicants. If the employer had continued to use arrest
records in evaluating white workers only, a white worker would have
been able to initiate an action alleging that he had been treated dif-
ferently on the basis of race. The court's decision, in effect, prevents
an employer from eliciting arrest information so long as there are black
applicants.
Assembly Bill 1053,* which I introduced in the 1971 Session of the
Legislature, was designed to provide statutory relief for any individual
who has been denied employment because of his arrest record where
the arrest did not lead to conviction. Specifically, the bill would pro-
hibit any employer, including most government employers, from asking
an employee or applicant for employment any question regarding an
arrest that did not result in conviction, or to inquire or cause another
to inquire on his behalf regarding such an arrest. The liability for
each violation would be set at $1,000 or actual damages (including
costs and attorney's fees) suffered by the employee or applicant,
whichever amount is greater.
The bill was amended to exempt employers from any liability for in-
quiring into an arrest of an employee during, but not prior to, such
employee's period of employment. The provisions of the bill have no
application to the state, or any department of the state or any em-
ploying agent thereof, with respect to a employee who is, or is apply-
ing to be, an examiner of a financial insitution, nor is the bill applicable
to employing agents of law enforcement agencies.
This approach goes to the heart of the problem. As indicated ear-
lier, the main adverse effect of disclosure is on the person who is re-
fused a job or fired from his job because of his record. By assuring
the person, whose record is disclosed, a cause of action against the em-
ployer, it is hoped that employers will be deterred from surreptitiously
obtaining this information.
of the male working population. A total of 56 percent of male blacks residing in the
black communities of the major cities have been arrested. SUPPLEMENTAL STUDIES FOR
Tm NATIONAL ADVIsoRY COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS 247 (1968).
86. 316 F. Supp. 401, 404 (C.D. Cal. 1970).
87. See generally, Wassenaar, Title VII-Racial Discrimination in Employment-
Employers Use of Record of Arrests Not Leading to Conviction, 17 WAYNE L. REv.
228 (1971).
* [Ed. note] A.B. 1053 failed to pass the Senate Judiciary Committee.
Pacific Law Journal / Vol. 3
CONCLUSION
There is substantial evidence that employers utilize arrest records in
their hiring of prospective employees. Testimony before the Assembly
Committee on Criminal Procedures8 indicates that employers discrimi-
nate against persons who have been arrested. Surveys among em-
ployers and employment agencies have confirmed that this discrimina-
tion is standard procedure among the majority of employers and em-
ployment agencies.8 9
The utilization of artrest records by employers becomes more dis-
quieting when one realizes that only 50 percent of those arrested are
ever convicted of a crime. 0 Any person can be subjected to an un-
lawful arrest (without a warrant or probable cause); anyone can be ar-
rested because of mistaken identity. The injudicious use of arrest rec-
ords by employers deprives an innocent person of due process. It ef-
fectively imposes a penalty, loss of job opportunity, merely because
the person was arrested, not because he committed a crime.
A person who was arrested by mistake will usually wish to forget
the whole matter. The employer's use of his arrest record constitutes
an invasion of his privacy. Arrest records are not a matter of public
record and should not be made "public" by distribution to employers.
One author has called the increasing invasion of privacy in our tech-
nological society "the new and unusual punishment."'O
The California Penal Code restricts the disssemination of records
maintained by the Criminal Identification and Investigation Bureau. 92
The Penal Code also provides that disposition reports must be sent
to the C.I. & I.93 But these provisions do not impose civil or criminal
liability upon persons who unlawfully disseminate or solicit the unlaw-
ful dissemination of these records. Since it is difficult for the individ-
ual to prevail on a tort theory of invasion of privacy when an employer
obtains the records from a public agency, a statutory remedy is neces-
sary to protect the arrested individual who is innocent.
An effective civil cause of action against the employer who wrongfully
obtains these records would deter employers from utilizing arrest rec-
ords in evaluating prospective employees. This private cause of ac-
tion would also mitigate the damage sustained by the innocent individual
who bears the stigma of an indelible record of arrest.
88. See text at note 16 supra.
89. See text at notes 13-15 supra.
90. See text at note 2 supra.
91. Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.. 755 (1964).
92. See text beginning at note 58 supra.
93. Id.
